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This chapter seeks to argue that four nations interpretations of the mod-
ern history of Britain and Ireland have been overdetermined by a met-
anarrative of national decline or disintegration. Raphael Samuel captured 
this succinctly and eloquently in 1995 when he discussed the circum-
stances surrounding the emergence of four nations history in terms of ‘a 
vertiginous sense of impending loss’.1 That sense of something important 
slipping away—whether it was the UK’s place in the wider world or the 
loosening of cohesive ideas of national identity at home—has motivated 
attempts to chart the complex historical relationships between the differ-
ent parts of ‘these islands’. Understanding the origins of British institu-
tions and identities in the past has never seemed more urgent than when 
they appeared to be in decline or undergoing dissolution in the pre-
sent. This chapter questions the terms of that discussion by focusing on 
three areas that have been central to research in the field: the nature of 
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the British state, how national identities are understood, and the ways in 
which transnational history presents opportunities for situating this his-
tory in an international and, indeed, a global context. It suggests that 
more systematic recognition of a metanarrative of decline has the poten-
tial to open up other avenues of enquiry and alternative interpretations.
*****
This argument requires a brief excursus into the circumstances that 
shaped the emergence of this field of enquiry, the reasons for the empha-
sis on decline, and an explanation for its enduring influence. A four 
nations approach to the history of Britain and Ireland arose out of a 
period of political uncertainty, institutional change and cultural dissen-
sion in the 1960s and 1970s. It occurred as a concerted response to a 
complex of developments that included decolonisation, the re-emergence 
of ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, the UK joining what was then the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the abortive plans for devo-
lution to Scotland and Wales. J.G.A. Pocock’s ‘plea for a new subject’ in 
1975 occurred against that background. Particularly relevant in his case 
was the United Kingdom turning away from the old settler colonies.2
The broad outlines of this context are well known and well-rehearsed, 
but their consequences for subsequent historical enquiry have not been 
fully explored. Most historians who responded to the plea for a more 
plural history were shaped by what Christopher Harvie has characterised 
as ‘the moment of British nationalism’, spanning the years between 1939 
and 1970.3 Harvie’s ‘moment’ began with the Second World War, an 
experience that provided a new impetus to older ideas of British iden-
tity that were forged in opposition to an external threat, while the peace-
time settlement reinforced pan-British solidarities through the welfare 
state.4 It was a perception that such feelings of common interest were 
unravelling that provided the underlying rationale for four nations his-
tory. Locating historians who embraced a more plural interpretation of 
the British and Irish past in this context should not be taken to mean 
that they embraced nationalism, but rather that they had acquired a 
heightened awareness of the British dimension to the past in a discipline 
that, to a large extent, had been unreflexively Anglocentric.
A challenge to that entrenched view of the past was also made pos-
sible by the effects of institutional reconfiguration. University expansion 
and changes to the culture of academia in the 1960s and 1970s began to 
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transform the character of historical studies and created an environment 
conducive to experimentation with new approaches and methodologies.5 
Such changes both destabilised an existing paradigm and energised those 
who wished to work outside its frameworks. To use a concept devised 
by the cultural critic Raymond Williams, four nations history emerged 
in a particular ‘structure of feeling’, an idea he also formulated in more 
general terms as ‘the culture of a period’.6 These developments inspired 
some historical studies that focused on the formation of the United 
Kingdom in the eighteenth century, whereas during the 1990s ‘dissolu-
tion’ emerged as a new metanarrative of modern British history.7
This was demonstrated by the titles of a number of books during 
the 1990s, all of which ended with question marks. These included an 
important collection of essays called Uniting the Kingdom?, published in 
1995, Kingdoms United? and A Disunited Kingdom?, which appeared 
around the time a devolved parliament and assemblies were being estab-
lished.8 These question marks clearly reflected uncertainty regarding the 
relationship between the apparently disintegrative tendencies of the pre-
sent and how they might have consequences for interpretations of the 
past. Samuel summed this up in lyrical fashion by channelling Hegel: 
‘History notoriously takes wing at dusk, that twilight hour when shad-
ows lengthen, silence thickens and when (according to believers in the 
numinous) thought flies heavenwards and ghostly presences makes them-
selves felt.’9 Such uncertainties about British state development have 
continued. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, tensions over 
the UK’s relationship to the European Union (EU), the Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement and the rise of Scottish nationalism raise the question 
of whether separate national traditions of writing history in Britain and 
Ireland will be reinforced. Alternatively, new spaces for re-appraising four 
nations history in a more holistic way might emerge.10 The historians 
who seek out those spaces have not been shaped by Harvie’s ‘moment of 
British nationalism’ but by a post-imperial moment of sustained conten-
tion over the nature, size and shape of the state—politically, economi-
cally, militarily and culturally—that began in the 1970s and continued 
through the re-structuring of economic relationships and civic identities 
that took place between 1979 and the end of the twentieth century.11 
This is a different (albeit related) ‘structure of feeling’ to that which gave 
rise to four nations history in the first place, and it is one that has impli-
cations for the three themes considered below.
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Feelings of ‘crisis’ and dissolution have influenced historical interpre-
tations, albeit not always in a straightforward or linear fashion. Richard 
Weight’s study of national identity in Britain in the sixty years after the 
iconic date of 1940, for example, is ‘about why the people of Britain 
stopped thinking of themselves as British’. He argued that England, 
Scotland and Wales were ‘locked together’—a significant phrase—over 
four centuries, in ‘an uneasy relationship’.12 In this interpretation the 
partition of Ireland in 1921 and the unilateral declaration of a repub-
lic in the south in 1949, together with the imposition of direct rule in 
Northern Ireland in 1972, underline an uncompromising emphasis on 
dissolution as the guiding theme of recent British history. It is about 
how the unifying experiences of the Second World War and the post-
war welfare state unravelled over time: by the closing decades of the 
century the ‘moment’ of British nationalism was decisively over.13 This 
is an example of how a perception of national decline since the 1960s 
has over-determined the framework for discussion, rather like the debate 
about British economic decline since 1945. The validity of conceptualis-
ing post-war Britain in terms of a stark polarisation around ‘growth’ and 
‘decline’ has been the subject of debate, and a discussion of the British 
state and Britishness in terms of an opposition between integration and 
dissolution is also needed.14
This brief discussion of the origins and development of four nations 
history (its ‘structures of feeling’) alerts us to two things: first, that con-
temporary events have been central to its emergence and development; 
and, second, that there now exists a body of work in the field whose 
achievements can be evaluated. Consequently, it is possible to reach 
some conclusions about the intellectual ‘shape’ and direction of four 
nations history as it applies to the modern period and the key areas of 
enquiry that have attracted historians’ attention to date.
*****
One interpretation of a four nations approach to British and Irish his-
tory is that state formation should be the main focus of enquiry,15 and 
that (implicitly) a centralised form of historical enquiry should take prec-
edence after Great Britain was established in 1707.16 It is perhaps in this 
area that the application of four nations history to the British state faces 
one of its biggest challenges, having to confront a deeply embedded view 
of English state development that restricts its attention to the emergence 
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and establishment of centralised institutions. The challenge for historians 
lies partly in the fact that there is an older structural problem deriving 
from the relationship between the study of the state and the profession-
alisation of History as a discipline in British academia at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The chronol-
ogy of that professionalisation meant that it had a distinctive relation-
ship to the study of state structures, which in turn reflected a particular 
interpretation of the ‘English’ state. This is important because at the 
time, the development of state institutions was considered the ‘proper’ 
subject matter of history. According to Michael Bentley, ‘The British 
state congealed, in political terms, before the professionalisation of his-
tory began in Britain’, whereas the processes often went hand-in-hand 
in other countries.17 It might be said that no new national narrative was 
required for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland because 
central state institutions appeared to be largely unchanged following the 
parliamentary Unions of 1707 and 1801. Bentley argued that ‘British 
historians assumed the existence, in a fit of absence of mind, of a British 
state as an extension of an English one; and it was this state that they 
tended to consider.’18 The study of English state structures became the 
metanarrative of professional history in its formative years in the nine-
teenth century, and its echoes can still be heard in the interpretations of 
both professional and popular historians.19 Establishing History as a dis-
crete subject in the universities meant policing disciplinary boundaries; 
privileging the study of the state was part of that process.
Rather than being a product of the period of the state’s formation and 
growth, therefore, a four nations approach to the history of Britain and 
Ireland has arisen as a response to the perceived decline or potential dis-
solution of that state. In other words, it is a response to what is seen as 
an existential structural crisis in the fabric of the state, and this has deter-
mined the terms of debate. For some commentators, it is only the appar-
ently disintegrative tendencies in contemporary life that have exposed 
the ‘hiddenness’ of territorial relationships that have always been present 
but which have been concealed by the ideology of English constitutional 
development.20 It is recognition of the ‘hiddenness’ and anomalies of the 
condition of being a state with (at least) four nations that make an his-
torical interpretation based on plurality so significant.
The nature of the state and its relationship to territoriality is often 
neglected in accounts of its development, such as conceptions of Britain 
changing from a fiscal-military state in the mid-eighteenth century to a 
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laissez-faire state by the mid-nineteenth.21 However, a comparison of 
the Scottish and Irish unions, and the way in which some political sci-
entists now think of the United Kingdom as a state with different types 
of union, suggests that there is more to be said about the territorial 
dimensions of centralised state structures in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries.22 The idea of the UK as a unitary state in which territo-
rial questions were considered irrelevant or of marginal importance once 
dominated political science, but a new formulation in terms of a ‘union 
state’ has taken its place. This view insists on the continuing salience of 
territorial politics in spite of the existence of centralised state institu-
tions.23 According to the political scientist James Mitchell, the UK is 
‘a centralised and pluri-national state’.24 Mitchell has taken this way of 
conceiving of the state a step further with the suggestion that the term 
‘a state of unions’ captures more effectively the dynamic nature of the 
different types of union that co-exist in the UK and the different rela-
tionships that have developed over the centuries in Wales, Scotland and 
Ireland.25 The nature of what might be characterised as ‘union politics’ 
was not fixed but protean, a feature that can be counted as one of the key 
reasons for its continued strength, especially in Scotland but also in parts 
of Ireland.26 The study of such phenomena indicates that an opposition 
between centralisation and ‘disintegration’ is not the only leitmotif of 
histories of the state and its institutions. Instead of seeing a break-up of 
Britain, Mitchell describes a ‘Scottish Question’ that is about how Scots 
have negotiated their position in the Union over two centuries. This is a 
deeply historicised analysis and one that points in the direction of alterna-
tive ways of understanding the development of the British state. Thinking 
about the UK as a union state, or a state of unions, questions both a lin-
ear narrative focussed on the growth of central institutions and one that 
portrays such institutions as unravelling over time.27 Approaching the his-
tory of the British state from the perspective of more than one centre 
permits a consideration of those aspects of the British state and its activi-
ties that have had deeply territorial dimensions over a long period; against 
that background, the creation of devolved legislatures for Scotland 
and Wales at the end of the 1990s can be seen as a transitional phase 
in British state development rather than necessarily being a crisis arising 
from a process of disintegration. Centralisation and diversity have always 
been in tension, albeit to different degrees at specific times.
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*****
If there is one particularly well-developed field of enquiry associated 
with an attempt to write a plural history of Britain and Ireland it is how 
historians have tackled the emergence of Britishness as an identity and 
the extent to which it has lain on top of or displaced older identities. 
This is an important area of analysis partly because of the multinational 
character of the state and partly because of the widely held view that 
Britishness is a civic identity, in contrast to the supposedly ‘ethnic’ iden-
tities of the sub-state peoples. In 1975 Pocock identified nationality as 
one of the central methodological problems of the new field. Much of 
the debate on this question has centred on Britishness and the study of 
events and ideologies that have been responsible for national integration; 
however, in practice this has been a ‘three nations’ history.
In her landmark book, Britons, Linda Colley charted the creation 
of Britishness between the Act of Union with Scotland (1707) and the 
accession of Queen Victoria (1837): during this period Britishness was 
‘forged’.28 In one sense, her conclusion parallels that of E.P. Thompson’s 
iconic study of the English working class, which (he argued) was ‘made’ 
by the 1830s.29 While Colley focused primarily on the making of a truly 
British elite and Thompson analysed the working class, both approaches 
to this formative period can be characterised as portraying the United 
Kingdom, and especially England, as precociously modern. However, 
neither process—nation building nor class formation—can be considered 
finished by the early nineteenth century and in both cases continued to 
be negotiated (glaringly so in the case of the late 1830s and 1840s, when 
the combination of Chartism and the Irish Repeal movements chal-
lenged the state in fundamental ways).
Colley’s emphasis on the centrality of a Protestant identity to official 
British patriotism has tended to obscure the denominational fractures 
that sometimes took an ethnic character or were formed along national 
lines. The bitter split in the Scottish kirk over church patronage and, by 
implication, ownership of the ‘nation’ in 1843 (the ‘Disruption’) was 
one example of the tensions within Protestantism, whereas from 1847 
the struggle between nonconformists and Anglicans over who spoke for 
the Welsh people emphasised further divisions. Protestantism might be 
more usefully seen as a marbled identity, with internal fissures and fault 
lines that caused cracks in public unity.
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Colley’s analysis of the cohesive nature of Protestantism and an 
engagement with empire was complemented by an insistence on the 
shaping of Britishness in opposition to external enemies, and in particu-
lar around war with continental ‘Others’.30 To this extent, it can be seen 
as being complementary to the argument concerning the existence of a 
fiscal-military state to 1815, although it fits less easily with the picture of 
a laissez-faire state in the Victorian era. Colley insisted that the creation 
of Britishness did not entail the undermining of other national identi-
ties in Britain but rested on top of them. She contended that a blend-
ing of identities did not take place, and we should see the creation of 
Britishness in terms of the coming together of nations rather than their 
integration into a new identity.31 The extent to which such interpreta-
tions are applicable outside periods of war is more debateable. Keith 
Robbins, for example, in his study of the nineteenth century has taken 
a different line by emphasising that integration involved to some extent 
the erosion of the identities of the constituent nations of Britain, as well 
as reducing regional differences.32
The terms of the debate about the emergence and cultivation of 
British identities relied to a large extent on whether elites or popu-
lar identities were prioritised. In some ways, these different views of 
Britishness simply reflect the extent to which a sense of national identity 
was mobilised in European society as a whole in the two periods under 
discussion by Colley and Robbins. In others, however, they reflect differ-
ent approaches to historiography: the one allowing for a complementa-
rity between Britishness and the subordinate nationalities of the United 
Kingdom as distinct entities, the other emphasising that Britishness 
involved the creation of a hybrid identity. These characterisations not 
only matter as historical questions but also because they have implica-
tions for discussions about Britain in the present. Considerations of 
national identity in the twenty-first century frequently turn around sim-
ilar polarities. During the referendum campaign on Scottish independ-
ence in 2014 even the Scottish National Party (SNP) recognised the 
existence of a ‘social union’ between Scotland and the rest of the UK, 
consisting of ‘connections of family, history, culture and language’, a for-
mulation that implies acceptance of the idea that there had been some 
blending between countries over time. This was based on an historical 
understanding of the nature of Union and the intertwined relationships 
and identities it had created.33 Here is an example of how contempo-
rary events have helped shape a research agenda and, in turn, of how the 
products of that research inform how we frame current political debate.
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Much of the work about Britishness can be summarised as being 
about how the successful integration of Britain (rather than the United 
Kingdom) took place, and on what terms. Consequently, this debate 
revolves around an opposition between integration and diversity. One 
notable feature is the tendency to exclude Ireland from the discussion 
of Britishness.34 This exclusion has tended to produce teleological his-
tories that emphasise the increasing success of Britishness as an umbrella 
identity in the modern period, almost as an antidote to the perception of 
dissolution in the present. Such an interpretation can be sustained only 
as a result of the prior decision not to take full account of the problem-
atic consequences of the Union with Ireland. It must be recognised that 
this decision to separate the histories of Ireland and Britain is one that is 
apparently welcomed by some (though by no means all) Irish historians; 
the fear is that the ‘new’ British history is ‘an attempt to assert at the 
level of culture and history a structure that has begun to crumble in the 
real world of politics’.35 Such tensions appear at the interface between 
the metanarrative of dissolution and the invention and development of 
Britishness as a national identity from the eighteenth century onwards.
The inclusion of Irish experiences in the historical discussion changes 
our view of the emergence and development of British identities in the 
modern period by introducing an internal ‘Other’ following the Act 
of Union of 1801. Because loyalty to Britain was a minority phenom-
enon in Ireland, Britishness inevitably became a site of contention there. 
Historians such as Christine Kinealy have used the Irish case to address 
the broader question of integration and diversity in the UK, arguing 
that ‘Ireland became a catalyst for change’.36 The idea that union with 
Ireland produced conditions that precipitated change in the UK—as 
opposed to being a ‘problem’ lying outside, or in opposition to main-
stream British narratives—is an important one, both because it raises 
questions about a linear interpretation of British national development 
and because it encourages a centred approach to understanding how a 
centralised polity managed increasingly intractable territorial problems 
within its borders. How the Union was negotiated in the Irish case had 
consequences for the otherwise different cases of both Scotland and 
Wales by focussing discussion on a variety of grievances in those coun-
tries that might not have gained traction in British politics had the ‘Irish 
Question’ not prised open spaces in which they could be discussed and 
validated. For example, nineteenth-century campaigns for land reform 
in Scotland received a major fillip from Irish agitations and legislation 
that was designed to deal with distinctive Irish conditions. The success 
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of Church disestablishment in Wales (achieved in 1919) was inconceiv-
able without Irish disestablishment in 1869, which set a precedent for 
breaking the link between Church and state for a specific territory within 
the UK. Such developments underline the significance of conceptualising 
the UK as a state of different unions with asymmetric relationships. This 
situation produced cultural and political dynamics that are difficult to 
accommodate in a model of core-periphery relationships that starts from 
a consideration of conditions at the centre and treats different experi-
ences as a largely uniform ‘fringe’.
The inclusion of Irish Unionism further complicates the idea of what 
British national identity means, and it presents the paradoxical picture 
of a form of Britishness that was both loyalist and destabilising to exist-
ing political conditions. An emphasis on the particularity of the histori-
cal conditions that produced such a situation is appropriate but in the 
same way that Irish nationalism had echoes in the politics of Scotland 
and Wales, Irish Unionism created alliances in Britain.37 Furthermore, 
the connections between Unionist Ireland and Britain are underlined 
by Irish Protestant migrants to Britain who ensured that the Orange 
Order thrived in some British towns and cities. Its activities in these 
places illuminate patterns of religious sectarianism in towns and cities 
on both sides of the Irish Sea, thus collapsing the conventional divide 
between the histories of the two countries.38 At some points in modern 
history, it can be argued, the Irish Sea area makes a more compelling 
cultural-geographical context than one based on nations, whether Irish 
or British. This is particularly true of the connections between Ulster and 
Scotland.39
This brings us back to the influence of ideas of dissolution in the pre-
sent. One curious consequence of an agenda driven by a debate over 
national decline as a result of devolution to the Celtic countries is the 
way it has produced few sustained discussions about how England relates 
to a wider British context. If including Ireland in accounts of Britishness 
creates problems for unitary narratives of British history, then so does 
the history of England, for different reasons and in different ways, and 
it presents challenges for attempts to write a plural history of Britain 
and Ireland. This is the elephant in the four nations room. Any attempt 
to construct a four nations narrative immediately comes up against the 
demographic and political weight of England, thus raising the question 
of the extent to which England and Englishness can be separated from 
a broader British identity since the eighteenth century. Recognition of 
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the fact that ‘Englishness was the core of Britishness, even if it was not 
synonymous with it’40 has led to the accusation that four nations history 
is little more than the old English history dressed in new clothes. As the 
dominant constituent part of the UK, England is difficult to accommo-
date within this perspective precisely because in population terms it is 
so large in relation to Scotland, Wales and Ireland, and it became pro-
gressively so during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In that con-
text, how does the idea of the British state as one composed of different 
unions—a state of unions—apply to the territory at its core—England?
An indication of the challenges can be seen in the multi-volume 
New Oxford History of England. Reviewing Boyd Hilton’s monumen-
tal study of the period from 1783 to 1846, Linda Colley asked how a 
history of England could be ‘isolated and reconstructed’ from the com-
plex transnational and, indeed, transcontinental connections that shaped 
British history.41 Hilton achieved this by largely focusing on elites and 
on southern English elites in particular. Another contributor to the 
series, K.T. Hoppen, took a different approach by including chapters on 
Scotland, Wales and Ireland in his study of the mid-Victorian decades.42 
As these contrasting examples demonstrate, defining how England 
relates to the polity it has dominated is no easy task. One way ahead 
would be to recognise that the UK has been an asymmetric multinational 
state and that a four nations history of that state and its peoples must be 
asymmetrical too. Perhaps we need to return to Pocock’s formulation for 
inspiration here: that British history should properly denote the ‘plural 
history of a group of cultures situated along an Anglo-Celtic frontier and 
marked by an increasing English political and cultural domination’.43
It is along this line of division, and sometimes of assimilation, that the 
connection of Englishness to Britishness can be most profitably studied. 
Studies of English identity become particularly relevant in that context.44 
Krishan Kumar argues that ‘English national identity cannot be found 
from within the consciousness of the English themselves’, a conclusion 
that points to the need for both a consideration of the boundaries of the 
varieties of Englishness in Britain and Ireland and of how they have been 
constituted by international interactions.45 At the other pole to interna-
tional dimensions to English identity is the construction and expression 
of regional identities and their complex relationships to Englishness. This 
is particularly evident in the tenacious binary opposition in popular cul-
ture and political discussion between ‘North’ and ‘South’, two categories 
that are as much about cultures and values as they are about geography 
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and economy. The extent of regionalism and the relationship between 
regions and southern elites is an uneasy dimension to this history. In 
other words, English identity is a contested discourse that fractures along 
the lines of region as well as social class; in some interpretations, the 
two intertwine. A more textured analysis of English identity can (and in 
some cases has) reveal the patchwork nature of Englishness in which not 
only the category of ‘England’, but also homogenising formulations of 
‘North’ and ‘South’, is questioned.
Pocock’s use of the term ‘frontier’ points towards how borders have 
been both created and erased over time, and the complicated ways in 
which administrative, cultural and linguistic boundaries have shifted.46 
However, this approach has yet to be fully developed as a way of 
addressing the complexity of interactions across the islands in the mod-
ern period. Key themes such as maritime trade, migration, technologi-
cal transfer and material history are potentially rich and fruitful areas of 
enquiry, as shown by research on Irish migration to Britain which points 
to the possibilities of this approach.47 Changing linguistic boundaries 
are not only features of the Celtic countries, although they have particu-
lar relevance there.48 A study of regions and their relationships to other 
regions and nations, not just in England, is one way of problematising 
the idea of the nation;49 perhaps a difficulty in applying a systematic 
regional model to Britain has deterred historians from embracing the 
region as a building block of analysis, favouring the older administrative 
unit of the county instead.50
Considered in the round, the study of Britishness has worked in well-
worn historiographical grooves and has been methodologically timid. 
An obvious gap in approaches to the history of the twentieth century is 
the use of oral history and memory studies.51 Biography also promises 
to supply new insights into the complexity, instability and malleability of 
identities. One example demonstrates the potential benefits. Although 
not in the front rank of labour leaders, Huw T. Edwards (1892–1970), 
known in the 1950s as ‘the unofficial Prime Minister of Wales’, has 
attracted scholarly attention for the way his life embodied both British 
and Welsh identities. His activities as a trade union leader and promi-
nent figure in public life after 1945 make him an ideal vehicle for teas-
ing out the complex intersection of class, region, nation and gender, and 
how the expression of such identities varied from one social domain to 
another.52 What social anthropologists have called ‘thick description’ 
is relevant here. The self-fashioning of individuals like Edwards points 
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towards a complexity that goes beyond an opposition between inte-
gration and dissolution,53 and biographical studies demonstrate that 
hybridity and overlapping identities are not exceptional.54 Similarly, an 
interrogation of identity from the perspective of migrants and ethnic 
minorities complicates the picture further by posing the question of how 
identity formation has taken place in relation to internal ‘Others’.55
An example of the paradoxical consequences of identity forma-
tion can be shown by a brief examination of the autobiography of Pat 
O’Mara, who grew up in Liverpool as the son of Irish migrants before 
the First World War. His autobiography is an act of self-fashioning as an 
‘Irish slummy’, an ethnic identity rooted in precarious social and eco-
nomic conditions and a particular type of working-class community. He 
described the ‘intense religious atmosphere’ of his Catholic school, where 
children were ‘rather patriotised and Britishised’, until they returned 
home where they were ‘sternly Irishised’. He outlined his complex iden-
tity as an adult as ‘something like this: ferocious, sacrificial Irish-Catholic 
(die for Ireland’s freedom) first; ferocious sacrificial patriotic Britisher 
second; and patient, wondering dreamer third’. He claimed that ‘what is 
true of me is true certainly of most slummy Irish-Catholic “Britishers”.’56 
How individuals such as this negotiate contradictions in the different lay-
ers of their identities is often obscured in general narratives.
*****
If Britishness and national identity have been key threads of four 
nations history, then the transnational and global dimensions to that his-
tory have also been important. This is one way of moving an introspec-
tive discussion of national identity onto a broader canvas.57 How such an 
approach might be mapped onto four nations history presents a num-
ber of different, albeit overlapping, paths, from a concern with ‘Greater 
Britain’ and the Atlantic, to empire, globalisation and the so-called 
‘British world’, and it poses the underlying question of ‘dissolution’ in 
different ways.58 Such concerns speak to a post-imperial malaise and a 
search for international relevance in a changing world; after all, the area 
where the metanarrative of dissolution most clearly applies is that of the 
empire, if only because the British Empire is definitively over.
The formulation of a research agenda for the ‘new’ British history in 
the 1970s initially looked in a different direction, emphasising Atlantic 
contexts, but while this has been a particularly productive area of study 
for early modernists, it is more problematic to situate the history of 
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Britain (perhaps less so in the case of Ireland) primarily in that context 
for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.59 To be sure, Atlantic inter-
actions, migration and exchange have been integral parts of the modern 
experience,60 while the idea of a ‘Black Atlantic’ has also gained pur-
chase.61 Transatlantic perspectives on the racial violence that broke out 
in Britain after the First World War, for example, have provided new 
insights,62 and the themes of Americanisation and Atlanticism in the 
twentieth century are important areas of enquiry. However, for much of 
the modern period it is the empire that furnishes the main transnational 
context for understanding interactions with a wider world. This loops 
back to the earlier discussion of the nature of the British state by posing 
the question of whether we should think of it as an empire state as well 
as a union state and whether the end of empire precipitated a crisis in 
that state.63
Assessing the impact of the end of empire depends in part on the prior 
question of the extent of popular imperialism in the preceding centuries. 
A discussion of how far the British and Irish peoples embraced empire, 
or were affected by it, has often been viewed through the lenses of social 
class and gender. By contrast, the doyen of imperial historians, John 
M. Mackenzie, has argued persuasively for a ‘four nations’ approach to 
the history of the empire as well,64 thus promising to reassess familiar 
themes of commerce, conquest, Christianity and decolonisation by add-
ing nation and ethnicity to class and gender. For example, the distinctive 
Scottish engagement with empire demonstrates a layering of Scottish, 
British and imperial identities that can be traced through to the 1960s.65 
The impact of the end of empire on Scottish society is a matter of some 
debate, with Bryan S. Glass insisting that the rise of Scottish national-
ism from the 1960s can be explained—at least in part—by the decline 
of Scottish engagement with empire.66 This is another intersection of 
perceived disintegration in the present being reflected in interpretations 
of the past. If the United Kingdom and empire were mutually constitu-
tive, then the decline of both can be seen as reinforcing developments. 
Furthermore, if such a relationship is accepted, it is clear that this oper-
ated in different ways and to different degrees in the constituent parts of 
the country.
The Irish and Welsh encounters with empire present distinctive ways of 
thinking of the imperial experience, whether such encounters were mili-
tary, commercial or religious. Missionary activity brings this dimension out 
particularly clearly. As has been argued above, the outer shell of a common 
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Protestant culture in Britain papered over a diverse and often fractious set 
of denominational cultures that sometimes mapped onto national differ-
ences, and those differences were refracted through missionary engage-
ments with empire. What it meant to be a Welsh-speaking Calvinistic 
Methodist missionary in the hills of Khasia, in what is now Bangladesh, 
was different to being a minister of the Scottish kirk in central Africa or an 
English Anglican vicar in Australia; yet all would probably have considered 
themselves British to one extent or another, and all were implicated in the 
geopolitics of empire.67 Similarly, various forms of Irish engagement with 
the imperial venture have navigated the tortuous boundary between being 
both a coloniser and the object of colonisation.68
Discussing empire in this way prompts a consideration of how British 
legacies appear from the former settler colonies, such as Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand.69 Awareness of being part of a new phase 
of globalisation—possibly a defining feature of the current ‘structure of 
feeling’—has led to the promotion of the ‘British world’ as a subset of 
global history. This is intended to move beyond a study of links with the 
settler colonies, or even the formal and informal empires, to embrace a 
truly global perspective. At a time when the UK’s place in the world is 
uncertain, this field boldly asserts ‘Britain’s central role as the proximate 
cause of the modern world configuration’, thus making British history 
‘central, vital and irreplaceable to modern history’.70 It is concerned with 
questions of diaspora, culture and identity,71 and it implicitly rejects a 
narrative of dissolution. This conception of a plural and diverse British 
world has been facilitated by new technologies such as digitisation that 
have made empirical research on a transnational scale a practical propo-
sition; it signals a move away from a feeling of post-imperial malaise to 
a more self-confident narrative of British success in shaping modernity. 
However, such a shift is not without its own problems. Modernity is not 
a value-free or one-dimensional concept, and the extent to which Britain 
shaped the world or the world shaped it remains a live question.
*****
While the themes discussed here are not the only ones of significance 
in four nations history as it relates to the modern period, they provide an 
indication of the challenges faced by historians. This chapter has situated 
the emergence of the field in a particular ‘structure of feeling’ and has dis-
cussed the metanarrative of national dissolution that has underpinned it. 
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It has argued that we need to pay closer attention to how contemporary 
events have influenced historical interpretations, in particular the unravel-
ling of the ‘moment of British nationalism’, the re-constituting of the state 
along new lines in the late twentieth century, and the impact of another 
phase of globalisation. Grappling with the post-imperial implications of 
Britain’s place in the world has been a significant backdrop to four nations 
history. To this extent, it mirrors the debate about British economic 
decline since 1945.
In 1990 Keith Robbins—one of the pioneers of ‘four nations’ his-
tory—reflected that there seemed to be ‘an increasing recognition that 
a subtler and more variegated modern “British” history is necessary’, 
although he added that ‘no one would claim that there is a simple or 
single framework for it’.72 Raphael Samuel alluded to a similar point 
when he wrote: ‘Being polycentric it [four nations history] has no natu-
ral heartland or consecutive narrative.’73 An overriding feature of four 
nations history has been a determination to question narratives of a uni-
tary British past and to ask what a national past might mean. An integral 
part of this questioning has been the rejection of Anglocentric narratives 
of British history that were established in academia when History was 
first professionalised as a discipline and, according to some historians, a 
rejection of national narratives altogether in favour of a multi centred, 
more complex approach.74 Although ‘four nations’ history (by its very 
terminology) can be seen as a way of replacing one form of nation-cen-
tred analysis with another, its disruption of existing narratives also cre-
ates spaces for interrogating the nation as a framework for historical 
analysis.75
Using the methodologies of, for example, comparative history is an 
obvious way around the homogenising tendencies of national frame-
works, providing one way of capturing the totality of the complex 
historical relationships in these islands, and of addressing the asymmet-
rical nature of those relationships and their transnational dimensions. 
Scottish-Irish comparisons of the social, economic and cultural history 
of the two countries, for example, have been successful in de-centring 
British history by creating an alternative socio-geographical axis.76 
Similarly, comparative analysis of the Irish and Scottish Unions also chal-
lenges established ways of seeing British history from the perspective of 
the centre, while at the same time engaging with the state and its insti-
tutions.77 Including the apparently anomalous position of Wales in that 
discussion complicates the position further because of that country’s 
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absorption into English state structures in the sixteenth century and the 
gradual process of establishing a new national institutional framework 
and identity from the second half of the nineteenth century. Research on 
areas such as the land question,78 monarchy,79 social policy,80 women’s 
suffrage,81 and schooling82 has demonstrated how starting with what is 
perceived as the margins of the United Kingdom can change our views 
of familiar topics, thereby unveiling the ‘hiddenness’ of a plural and 
asymmetric history in the process. This has the advantage of enabling 
systematic cross-fertilisation of research from different national historio-
graphical traditions in Britain and Ireland, and beyond. How the four 
nations’ past was racialised and gendered remains to be fully explored.
This chapter began with a brief exploration of how the unravel-
ling of post-war solidarities from the 1960s was a distinctive ‘structure 
of feeling’ that embedded the metanarrative of dissolution alongside 
that of perceived economic decline. This often resulted in discussions 
that revolved mainly around the opposition of integration and diversity. 
It has been supplanted by a different, but comparable structure of feel-
ing among historians who have been shaped by a neo-liberal consensus 
about the state and globalisation. The referendums on Scottish inde-
pendence in 2014 and the UK’s membership of the EU in 2016 suggest 
that a metanarrative of dissolution will not be superseded soon: conflict 
and division in the present will undoubtedly continue to spur historians 
to discover comparable phenomena and diversity in the past. However, 
this is a restricting framework for understanding the full breadth and 
complexity of interactions across Britain and Ireland in the past. By con-
trast, Tom Nairn—a writer who did more than most to embed a percep-
tion that the UK had entered a period of disintegration by popularising 
the term ‘the break-up of Britain’—asked in 2001 whether devolution 
had fashioned a new union, rejecting ‘the gloomy prognosis of “four 
nations” doomsterism’.83 If loss and a sense of impending doom have 
been the guiding lights of four nations history, it might be time to 
return to Pocock’s emphasis on a plural British and Irish past that rec-
ognises and explores hybridity without being constrained by an opposi-
tion between integration and dissolution. Shifting cultural and political 
boundaries need not be the same as disintegration.
Moving beyond a polarity dictated by this underlying narrative struc-
ture entails embracing a research agenda that recognises the territorial 
dimensions of the UK state as an essential, rather than an incidental, fea-
ture of its composition and history. This means not only exploring the 
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different national cultures of the state but also working into that account 
an awareness of how the concentration of institutions of government in 
the south-east corner of England has often obscured centre-periphery 
relations, inside England just as much as between England and the other 
nations. A way of doing this is to conceive of modern British and Irish 
history in terms of a series of asymmetric developments rooted in uneven 
and shifting relationships and identities over time. A framework of this 
kind does not lend itself to obvious popular narratives but it does prom-
ise a richer and more textured history that takes fuller account of what is 
a complex past.
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